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Gora: First Amendment

BACK FROM THE BRINK: PART H
Judge Leon D. Lazer:
Our afternoon program will cover the First Amendment, then
deal with a number of very important cases that do not
necessarily fit into one of the Bill of Rights niches. That Bill of
Rights section of the program will be covered by Professor
Friedman. Then, Professor Eileen Kaufman will speak on
employment discrimination and punitive damages. Additionally,
Professor Friedman is going to give us a short review of federal
jurisprudence dealing in land use planning cases. In the
meantime, let us get started. For the past several years, one of
the real stars of this annual show has been Professor Joel Gora of
Brooklyn Law School, an authority on the First Amendment. He
has been general counsel to the New York American Civil
Liberties Union, and was National Staff Counsel to the American
Civil Liberties Union. He was a pro se clerk at the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals and is the co-author of a book entitled
"The Right to Protest." 1 It is my pleasure to introduce Professor
Gora.
ProfessorJoel M. Gora:
This is my third year participating in this Symposium to discuss
the Supreme Court's First Amendment handiwork, and I am
honored to be here. In 1991, I styled my talk, On the Brink: The
First Amendment in the Rehnquist Court, and I commented
balefully on the Court's mixed record in protecting free speech
rights. 2 The second year, however, my mood was more upbeat
and I confessed that my previous reports of the death of the First
Amendment had been greatly exaggerated. Hence the talk was
entitled: Back from the Brink, and I happily commented on some
powerful First Amendment rulings. 3
1. JOEL M. GORA, ET AL., THE RIGHT To PROTEST (1991).
2. Joel M. Gora, On the Brink: The First Amendment in the Rehnquist

Court, 1990-91 Term, 8 Touao L. REv. 111 (1992).
3. Joel M. Gora, Back From the Brink, 9 Touto L. REv. 251 (1993).
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I guess this year is the sequel, Back from the Brink II, although
quantitatively, qualitatively and doctrinally, it seemed like a
relatively quiet year. The Court blazed no major new First
Amendment trails, but the Term contained some important
rulings. If there was any theme that seemed to echo across many
of the cases it can be expressed in two words: "Why me?" One
of my colleagues, Richard Farrell, 4 always likes to kid me about
constitutional law by remarking that its various doctrines and
thousands of decisions can be boiled down to a few manageable
phrases. All due process of law is simply the question: "Is it
fair?" And all the equal protection cases ever decided can be
reduced down to somebody asking: "Why me?"
Well, the First Amendment has a powerful equal protection
component, insisting that government treat all comparable
speakers in a comparable manner. 5 The bans against viewpoint
discrimination and the insistence on content neutrality in
regulation are cornerstones of First Amendment safeguards and
their equal protection resonance is clear. 6 Indeed, in some ways
the worst form of censorship is not silencing all speakers on a
given issue, but silencing only one side of the debate. And so the
notion of "equality as a central concern of the First Amendment"
was manifest in many of the Court's rulings this Term.
This "Why Me?" theme played out in a number of the Court's
eight First Amendment cases. 7 Three dealt with the commercial

4. Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble; and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." Id.
6. See Kenneth B. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First

Amendment, 43 U. Cmi. L. REv. 20 (1975).
7. Alexander v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 2766 (1993); United States v.
Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S.Ct. 2696 (1993); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills
Sch. Dist., 113 S.Ct. 2462 (1993); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City

of Hialeah, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (1993); Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S.Ct. 2194
(1993); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S.Ct.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss2/7

2

19941

Gora: First Amendment

FIRST AMENDMENT

461

speech doctrine, three dealt with separation of church and state,
one involved the forfeiture sanction for obscenity sales and the
final case dealt with imposing stiffer sentences for bias-motivated
crimes. The box score was five to three, i.e., infive cases the
individual prevailed against government; in three cases the
government's position prevailed. Those three cases involved
lotteries, pornography and bigotry, and the government's power
to deal with those concerns overcame the First Amendment.
COMMERCIAL SPEECH CASES
This was an unusually active year for commercial speech cases.
The Court's doctrine in this field goes back, of course, about two
decades. In 1975 and again in 1976, the Court ruled for the first
time that even purely commercial advertising for goods and
8
services was entitled to significant First Amendment protection.
But persistent issues have remained: Does commercial speech
receive "lesser" protection than political speech? If so, what is
the dividing line between the two, and what forms may the lesser
protection take? What leeway is government regulation to be
given in sensitive settings such as solicitation of clients by
professionals? Can truthful information about lawful goods or
services nonetheless be banned from being advertised? If so,
under what kinds of showing? In its 1992-93 Term, the Court
revisited many of these issues.

2141 (1993); Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993); City of Cincinnati v.

Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).
8. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 1817, 1829-30 (1976). The Court held that the Virginia statute could
not suppress the flow of prescription drug price information because the
commercial speech was protected under the First Amendment. Id.; Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975). The Court stated that speech in a
commercial advertisement for procuring abortions was not "stripped" of First
Amendment protection merely because it reflected commercial interests or
because it appeared in commercial form. Id.
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Cincinnativ. Discovery Network, Inc.9
The Court's Term got off to a flying start with a case which
sharply probed the question of the extent to which commercial
speech receives "lesser" protection under the First Amendment.
The setting involved Cincinnati's efforts to further its concerns
with safe and attractive sidewalks by controlling the presence of
freestanding news racks on public streets. 10 The city had
approximately 2,000 such news racks, a mere twenty-four of
which were used to distribute a real estate newsletter and thirtyeight of which contained the publication of the Discovery
Network, an organization which provides adult social,
recreational and educational programs. 11
Having given these two organizations permission to place their
news racks on city streets in 1989, a year later the city notified
the two organizations that the permits were being revoked. 12 The
response of each was "Why me?" and not the 1,938 news racks
left unmolested. 13 Dusting off an old city ordinance banning the
distribution of "commercial handbills,"--although allowing the
circulation of newspapers--the city's answer was: "Because you
are commercial speech and are entitled to 'lesser' protection
under the First Amendment." 14 The Supreme Court's answer, six
to three, was: "No, they are not." Justice Stevens wrote the
opinion. 15

The case implicates important practical and doctrinal
considerations. In practicalterms, fully 50% of the single copy
sales of newspapers in America are news rack sales. 16 Indeed
news racks are ubiquitous on our city streets and have become, in
effect, a new medium of communication. In doctrinal terms, the
9. 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).
10. Id. at 1508.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.

14. Id. at 1509.
15. Id. at 1507.
16. See id. at 1509 n.10. The statistical information was obtained from
amici curae briefs.
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case shed light on two themes of commercial speech law that
often seem in dissonance. The 1976 Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 17 case
held that commercial speech was entitled to significant First
Amendment protection. 18 But the 1980 Central Hudson Gas v.
Public Service Commission decision, 19 in articulating a four-part
formula for measuring the extent of that protection, seemed to
water down the general free speech thrust of the Virginia
PharmacyBoard case.
The first of the four Central Hudson factors is that the speech
must be lawful and not misleading. 20 Here, this part of the test
was easily met by both news rack publications. According to
Justice Harry Blackmun, the author of the 1976 Virginia
PharmacyBoard decision, the Court should stop there, period. If
speech is truthful and lawful, then any notions of commercial
speech having "lesser" protection have spent their force and the
21
speech becomes fully protected under the First Amendment.
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court in the news rack case, said
that this issue did not have to be reached and reserved it for
another day. 22 He reasoned that even if the rest of the Central
Hudson formula were applied, the Cincinnati ordinance could not
pass muster. 23
On the second factor, it was conceded by the publications that
sidewalk safety and urban aesthetics were substantial
governmental interests, 24 so the regulation survived that
hurdle, 25 as such regulations almost always do. The third factor
asked whether the regulation directly advanced those
governmental interests. 26 The Court did not really focus on this
17. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
18. Id. at 765-73.

19. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
20. Id. at 566.
21. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1517-18.
22. Id. at 1516.

23. Id.
24. Id. at 1509-10.

25. Id. at 1510.
26. Id.
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prong, though the dissent noted that the ordinance clearly did
advance the objectives, at least to the tune of having sixty-two
fewer news racks on the streets. 27
It was the fourth factor where the battle was joined. That
component asked whether there was a "reasonable fit" between
the objectives of the regulation and the selective restrictions on
commercial speech. 2 8 In other words, the fit required was not
between reducing news racks and promoting safety and
aesthetics, it was between the means of reducing only commercial
news racks and promoting the governmental ends of safety and
aesthetics. Viewed that way, the City ordinance failed the
reasonable fit test for a number of reasons. 29
First, the selective regulation was flawed because it only
controlled the tip of the iceberg, dealing with only three percent
of the problem. A better alternative would be to regulate the size,
shape, location, appearance and number of all news racks. 30
Moreover, the use of an ineffective means of regulation was
not justifiable by reference to the "lesser" status of commercial
speech. 3 1 The differences between the challengers' publications
and the traditional newspapers not subject to the selective ban
were not that stark. Newspapers contain lots of ads and these
magazines contain some information. 32 Equally important,
allowing the City Manager to determine whether a publication
was "primarily" a newspaper exempt from the ban or a
commercial handbill subject to the restraint, was fraught with
unacceptable censorship potential. 33

27. Id. at 1523.

28. Id. at 1511.
29. Id. at 1510-11.
30. Id. at 1510.

31. Id. at 1511. ("In our view, the city's argument attaches more
importance to the distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech
than our cases warrant and seriously underestimates the value of commercial
speech.").
32. Id.

33. Id. at 1511; see also Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486
U.S. 750, 763 (1988) ("[A] law or policy permitting communication in a
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But even judging the publications as "core" commercial
speech, the fit between acceptable ends and content-based means
was unreasonable. All news racks equally threaten safety and
aesthetics, regardless of their content, and therefore treating all
news racks equally is the only reasonable fit available. Put
bluntly: since the harm is not related to the content of the
periodical, the regulation cannot be either. Therefore, the
categorical ban on commercial distribution through news racks
could not be squared with the dictates of the First Amendment. 34
Justice Blackmun concurred to express his oft-stated position
that commercial speech can be treated as "lesser" speech only to
the extent it is fraudulent, coercive or illegal. 35 Otherwise, it is
fully protected under the First Amendment. 36 To the extent that
the use of the Central Hudson formula suggested otherwise, it
simply misled cities like Cincinnati into thinking they could make
such unwarranted content-based distinctions.
The dissenters, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and
Thomas, felt such distinctions were perfectly appropriate and
faulted the Court for impermissibly sneaking a "least drastic
alternatives" analysis into the "reasonable fit" equation. 37 The
result would be to limit severely municipal choices for dealing
with unsightly and dangerous news racks. Licensing is
questionable, as is an outright ban. Cities must therefore choose
between proliferation of news racks or treating The New York
Times as no better than the Learning Annex Newsletter, a parity
38
not mandated by the First Amendment.
certain matter for some but not for others raises the specter of content and
viewpoint censorship.").
34. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1517.
35. Id. at 1518 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 1520 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 1525 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 1521-22 ("Our jurisprudence has emphasized that 'commercial
speech [enjoys] a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its
subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values' [and is subject to]
'modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of non
commercial expression.'" (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447, 456 (1978))).
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The net effect of the Discovery Network ruling will be that
government will have a harder time targeting commercial speech
39
for second class citizenship and special hardships and burdens.

Edenfield v. Fane40
While the Cincinnati case dealt with balancing formulas and
commercial speech, Edenfield v. Fane dealt with another
important theme: regulation of commercial speech to prevent
fraud, coercion and overreaching. 4 1 It is clear that government
can so regulate, because in certain situations commercial speech
is a "lesser" form of speech than political speech. 42 In the latter
arena, regulation of even false and deceptive or illegal advocacy
43
speech is far more problematic.

39. Further exploration of these issues will likely come before the Court in
a pending case involving a municipal ordinance that bans most signs in public.
See Gilleo v. City of Ladue, 986 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 114 S.
Ct. 55 (1993).
40. 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
41. Id. at 1799; see also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 574. The Central
Hudson Court stated that restraints on commercial speech have been limited to
those that protect consumers from "fraudulent, misleading or coercive sales
techniques." Id.
42. See Edge Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 5 F.3d 59, 61 (4th Cir.
1992), aft'd, 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993) (holding that under First Amendment
analysis a lesser degree of protection is accorded commercial speech than other
constitutionally guaranteed expressions); Discovery Network, Inc. v. City of
Cincinnati, 946 F.2d 464, 469 (6th Cir. 1991), af4'd, 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).
43. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). The Court stated
that the Constitution guarantees "free speech [and] free press and do[es] not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action .... "
Id.; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). There is a
"national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust and wide open." Id. at 270. This concept may include
"vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials." Id. at 270.
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The cases involving issues of fraud, coercion and overreaching
have mostly involved lawyers. 44 In 1977 in the landmark case of
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,45 lawyers were allowed for the
first time to advertise service and price, 46 over the bitter
opposition of four dissenters who claimed that such advertising
would be inherently misleading and deceptive. 47 One year later,
the Court dealt with whether lawyers could engage in direct
personal solicitation of clients. 48 The Court upheld punishment of
an ambulance-chasing lawyer, holding that the State may
proscribe in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain under
circumstances likely to result in adverse consequence. 4 9 In a

companion case, however, the Court ruled that not all personal
solicitation of clients by lawyers was unprotected, permitting a
44. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 461 (1978). The
Court identified the "substantive evils of solicitation: stirring up litigation,
assertion of fraudulent claims, debasing the legal profession, and potential
harm to the solicited client in the form of overreaching, overcharging,
underrepresentation and misrepresentation." Id.; In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412,
432 (1978). The Court described the State's "regulatory program that was
aimed at the prevention of undue influence, overreaching, misrepresentation,
invasion of privacy, conflict of interest, lay interference, and other evils that
are thought to inhere generally in solicitation by lawyers of prospective
clients ....

."

Id.

45. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
46. Id. at 382. The Court found that advertising will allow the public to
compare the rates of competitors, thereby deciding for themselves whose rates
are reasonable. Id.
47. Id. at 395-96 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The dissent observed that although "some" misstatements in other advertising
may be immaterial, such misstatements are "quite inappropriate in legal
advertising" precisely because "the public lacks sophistication concerning legal
services ....

."

Id.

48. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449.
49. Id. at 467. In Ohralik, an attorney had approached two young accident
victims, soon after the accident, when they were "incapable of making an
informed decision." Id. He visited one victim in her hospital room. He led the
victims to believe that because his fee was contingent, the offer of his services
was "cost-free." He also induced one victim to sue based on information
obtained from the second victim. Id. at 468. The Court held that these facts
"present a striking example of the potential for overreaching that is inherent in
a lawyer's in-person solicitation of professional employment." Id. at 468.
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public interest lawyer to communicate with potential clients. 50
The Court has since upheld targeted mail solicitation by
51
lawyers.

But what about accountants? Are they different, better or worse
than lawyers? That was the issue in Edenfield v. Fane.52
Scott Fane, a New Jersey C.P.A., moved to Florida where he
wanted to use the same business methods that had succeeded in
New Jersey. He would call up small businesses and ask for an
appointment to discuss rendering service to them. 5 3 But he was
met with a Florida Board of Accountancy rule banning "direct,

in-person, uninvited solicitation" of clients. 54 The rule was
justified as necessary to safeguard the independence of C.P.A.s

and their public accounting responsibilities and to protect

consumers against fraud and deception. 5 5 Claiming instead that
this rule was the rankest economic protectionism, not to mention
unconstitutional, Fane filed suit.5 6 The Supreme Court, in an

50. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978). In Primis, the attorney, who
worked for the American Civil Liberties Union, gave a speech advising women
on public assistance, that if they had been sterilized as a result of medical
assistance under a Medicaid program, they may have legal recourse. Id. at
415. After the talk, the attorney had been advised that a Mrs. Williams was
interested in seeking possible recourse. Id. at 416. The attorney wrote to Mrs.
Williams informing her of when she would next be in town in case she wanted
to sue the doctor who performed the sterilization. Id. at 416, n.6. The attorney
was brought up on charges of violations of the disciplinary rules because of
this letter. Id. at 416-18. The Court held that the transmittal of a letter, as
opposed to in-person solicitation, did not involve an invasion of privacy; "nor
did it afford any significant opportunity for overreaching or coercion." Id. at
435.
51. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 476 (1988). The
Shapero Court stated that "because targeted, direct mail solicitation presents
lawyers with opportunities for isolated abuses or mistakes does not justify a
total ban on that mode of protected commercial speech ....
Id.
52. 113 S. Ct. at 1797.
53. Id. at 1796.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1798.
56. Id. at 1797.
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eight to one opinion written by Justice Kennedy, agreed with
Fane. 57

I have previously commented on Justice Kennedy's impressive
free speech and free press commitments and instincts and they
58
were manifest in this opinion.
First he observed that even though the Court had upheld a ban
on in-person solicitation by lawyers, not all such solicitation for

professional services is impermissible. 5 9 Indeed, Justice Kennedy
explained, in-person professional solicitation can have very
positive features by allowing a direct and spontaneous
interchange between buyer and seller; a two-way street that lets
the buyer of services evaluate the seller who would provide
them. 60 That way, speakers and listeners can decide the value of
ideas and information, not government:
The commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social and
cultural life, provides a forum where ideas and information
flourish. Some of the ideas and information are vital, some of
slight worth. But the general rule is that the speaker and the

57. Id. at 1795. Justice O'Connor was the sole dissenter in this case.
58. See Joel M. Gora, Back From the Brink, 9 TouRo L. REv. 251, 25455 (1993). The author has remarked that Justice Kennedy "has emerged as the
Court's most vigorous advocate of the fullest protection of First Amendment
fights." Id.
59. See Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1803 (stating that the nature of the
accounting profession differs in significant ways from legal services and their
soliciting targets making the imposition of such a ban on C.P.A.s
unnecessary); see also Spencer v. The Honorable Justices of the Supreme
Court, 579 F. Supp. 880, 890 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (stating that the interest in
prohibiting the evils of in-person solicitation are not present in the direct-mail
context).
60. See Edenfield, 113 S.Ct. at 1797-98. The Court stated that "personal
interchange enables a potential buyer to meet and evaluate the person offering
the product or service, and allows both parties to discuss and negotiate the
desired form for the transaction or professional relation."; see also Chralik,
436 U.S. at 458. The Court noted that "in-person solicitation may provide the
solicited individual with information about his or her legal rights and
remedies." Id.
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audience, not the government, assess the value of the information
61
presented.

Nonetheless, because commercial speech is inextricably
intertwined with the commercial transaction it proposes,
government interests in regulating the transaction may justify
regulating the speech. 62 That is where the Central Hudson
standard of review comes in. 6 3 Is the restriction on commercial
speech tailored in a reasonable manner to serve a substantial state
interest, i.e., does the restriction directly advance the substantial
interest? 64

Applying that formula, the Court found the ban on solicitation
by accountants unnecessary. 6 5 To be sure the state interests were

61. Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1798.
62. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 438. The Primus Court stated that "the
State's special interest in regulating members of a profession it licenses, and
who serve as officers of its courts, amply justifies the application of narrowly
drawn rules to proscribe solicitation that in fact is misleading, overbearing or
involves other features of deception or improper influence." Id.; Ohralik, 436
U.S. at 449, stating that the State may constitutionally "discipline a lawyer for
soliciting clients in person for pecuniary gain under circumstances likely to
pose dangers that the State has a right to prevent."
63. See CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 566. The Central Hudson Test provides
in pertinent part:
(1) whether the speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading;
(2) whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial; [and if the
answer to number one and number two are yes, then] determine, (3)
whether the regulation directly advances the asserted interest, and (4)
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Id.
64. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 378 (1977). The Bates Court
overturned an "advertising prohibition that was designed to protect the
'quality' of a lawyer's work," holding that these restraints were "an ineffective
way of directly deterring shoddy work." Id.; see also Central Hudson, 447
U.S. at 564. The Court noted that it has declined in the past to "uphold
regulations that only indirectly advance the state interest involved." Id.
65. See Edenfield, 113 S.Ct. at 1800. The Court held that simply because
the asserted interests are substantial, does not mean that a blanket prohibition
on solicitation serves them. Id. at 1801-02. "The Board's ban on CPA [sic]
solicitation as applied to the solicitation of business clients fails" to meet the
third prong of the Central Hudson Test. Id. at 1800.
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important: guarding against fraud, overreaching and vexatious
and
professional
standards
maintaining
solicitation;
independence. 6 6 The problem is the ban does not directly serve
those interests as applied to the solicitation of business clients. 67
The government has the burden of persuasion to show that the
"harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact
alleviate them to a material degree." 68 Pointing to the absence of
evidence of harm in the more than twenty states without such a
ban on accountant's solicitation, the Court ruled the burden of
69
proof had not been discharged.
Nor could the deficit be remedied by the asserted need for a
prophylactic rule to protect against situations with the potential
for fraud or overreaching. 70 In contrast to lawyers, the Court
reasoned, accountants are not trained as advocates and persuaders
who might overwhelm a vulnerable client; 7 1 most businesses are
not vulnerable to such pressures anyway; 72 and there is time to
reflect and respond to the accountant's overtures. 7 3 For that
66. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464. The Court stated that in situations which
are "inherently conducive to overreaching and other forms of misconduct the
State has a strong interest" in protecting the public from harmful solicitation by
the attorneys that were licensed by that state. Id.
67. See Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1800. In Edenfield, the Florida
Accountancy Board presented no studies or anecdotal evidence to support its
concern about the dangers of personal solicitation by C.P.A.'s in the business
context. Not even the defendant's conduct justified the Board's concerns. Id. at
1800.
68. Id. at 1795 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 1800.
70. Id. at 1802.
71. Id. at 1802-03. The Edenfield Court concluded that a C.P.A.'s training
is in objectivity and independence, not in advocacy or persuasion. Id.
72. Id. at 1803. The Court reasoned that a C.P.A.'s prospective clients are
"sophisticated and experienced business executives" who understand what a
C.P.A. has to offer. Id. Generally, the potential client has an accountant and
therefore, has a basis for evaluating the proposal of a C.P.A. seeking work.
Id. The manner in which a C.P.A. solicits business is conducive to rational
decision-making by the client unlike the "uninformed acquiescence" of a young
accident victim to any attorney immediately following a tragic accident. Id.
73. Id. The Court reasoned that because the clients a C.P.A. wishes to
"manipulate" meet the C.P.A. in their own offices at their own convenience,
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reason the imprecise and overbroad approach of a flat ban on inperson business solicitation is impermissible. 74
The implication for more broadly allowing in-person
solicitation by lIyers of business clients would seem to be clear:
Such contacts are probably protected as well, since the difference
between business lawyers and certified public accountants is
slim. 75 That is why Justice O'Connor, the lone dissenter,
bemoaned what the Court had done. 76 Indeed, she claimed that
the Court was wrong from the very beginning in Bates77 by
allowing the listener's interest in commercialism to overcome the
state's interest in professionalism. 7 8 "I see no constitutional

difference between a rule prohibiting in-person solicitation by

attorneys,

and a rule prohibiting in-person solicitation by

certified public accountants ...

1.79
And she may be right. The

if they are not interested in what the C.P.A. has to say they need not meet with
the C.P.A. at all. Generally, the prospective client will make their decision
with caution, they will check references and deliberate before hiring a new
C.P.A. Id.
74. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 476 (1988), stating
that a categorical ban of all direct mail solicitation is impermissible.
75. Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1805. The Court stated that an attorney's
power over potential clients does not come solely from the threat of persuasion
but also comes from their complex knowledge of a subject matter -- the law.
C.P.A.'s might be found to have a similar power over potential inexperienced
clients, stemming from their broad knowledge of accounting. Id. at 1805.
76. Id. at 1804 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
77. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor asserted that the
Court, "took a wrong turn with Bates v. State Bar of Arizona." Id.
78. Id. at 1803; see also Shapero, 486 U.S. 466; Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985). In
Justice O'Connor's view, cases such as Shapero and Zauderer incorrectly and
consistently focused on "whether the challenged advertisement directly
harm[ed] the listener." Justice O'Connor's dissent suggests that the states
should be prohibiting commercial speech that is "inconsistent with the
speaker's membership in a learned profession, and therefore damaging to the
profession and society at large." Id. at 1804.
79. Edenfield, 113 S.Ct. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Court's decision may remove most of whatever broad restraints

80
remain on in-person solicitation by lawyers.
81
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.

Finally, there was one commercial speech case last Term that
the government won. It involved a third doctrinal strand, namely,

whether truthful information, about a legal service or product,
involving no fraud or coercion, can ever be suppressed. And if it
can, what does that do to First Amendment values?

The case involved federal statutes that prohibit the broadcast of
lottery advertising by a broadcaster licensed to a state that does

not have a lottery, while allowing such ads to be carried by a
broadcaster licensed to a state that sponsors a lottery. 82 The
statutory disparity was challenged by Edge Broadcasting-

suitably named-which operates a radio station located at the
northeast edge of North Carolina, within hailing distance of the

80. See barez v. Florida, 114 S. Ct. 751 (1994). The Court may give a
further answer to some of these questions in a case where certiorari was
recently granted. In Ibarez, the Court agreed to hear a case involving whether
an accountant, who is also a lawyer, may use certain letterhead designations.
Id.
81. 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
82. The pertinent statutes at issue in this case were 18 U.S.C. §§ 1304,
1307 (Supp. 1988). 18 U.S.C. § 1304 provides in pertinent part:
Broadcasting Lottery Information. Whoever broadcasts by means of any
radio or television station for which a license is required by any law of
the United States ....
any advertisement of or information concerning
any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme, offering prizes dependent
in whole or in part upon lot or chance .... shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1307 provides in pertinent part:
Exceptions relating to certain advertisements and other information and
to State conducted lotteries.
(a) The provisions of §§ 1301, 1302, 1303 and 1304 shall not
apply to - (1) an advertisement, list of prizes, or other
information concerning a lottery conducted by a State acting
under the authority of State law which is -
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Virginia border. 83 Indeed, ninety-two percent of the
broadcaster's audience is in Virginia, which has a state-run
lottery, but the station is licensed in North Carolina, which does

not. 84 As a result, Edge's Virginia-licensed competitors can run
the very profitable lottery ads, but Edge cannot. 85 "Why me?"
Edge asked. "Here is why," the Supreme Court responded:
Because Congress said so, in an attempt to balance the interests
86
of lottery states versus non-lottery states.

The opinion for a seven to two Court was written by Justice
White, 87 who never met an Act of Congress he did not like. This
act had roots in the nineteenth century when Congress enacted,
and the Supreme Court upheld, bans on mailing of lottery

information or interstate transportation of lottery tickets. 88 More
recently, Congress had enacted a total ban on broadcasting lottery
(b) broadcast by a radio or television station licensed to a location
in that State or a State which conducts such a lottery.
Id.
83. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. at 2702.
84. Id. at 2702.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2704. The Supreme Court in Edge Broadcasting, found that the
"congressional policy of balancing the interests of lottery and nonlottery States
is the substantial governmental interest that satisfies the [third prong of the]
Central Hudson [test]." Id. Congress was found to support the anti-gambling
policy of North Carolina by forbidding stations licensed by this state from
airing lottery advertisements, even if such stations were to be heard in states
allowing the lottery. On the other hand, Congress was found not to have
interfered with the policies of Virginia, in that stations licensed in this state
could advertise lotteries, even if such advertisements were heard in states not
allowing the lottery. This rule was found to advance the governmental purpose
of supporting states to not sponsor gambling. Id.
87. Id. at 2700. Justice White wrote the opinion for the majority. Justice
Stevens wrote the dissent joined by Justice Blackmun. Id. at 2708.
88. See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903). In Champion, the
defendant was indicted for conspiracy to violate the Federal Lottery Act. The
law prohibited importing, mailing or transporting from one state to another any
lottery ticket. Champion, the defendant, challenged the constitutionality of the
act. Id. at 323-25. The Court held that, just as a state can forbid all sales of
lottery tickets within its limits to guard the morals of its citizens, Congress can
prohibit transporting lottery tickets in interstate commerce in order to protect
the public's morals and interstate commerce. Id. at 330.
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information, 89 but in the mid-1970's relaxed that restriction in
favor of the selective prohibition at issue here. 90 The lower
courts found the ban ineffectual: so much lottery information is
lawfully available within North Carolina that Edge's extra dollop
would not harm the state's interests in any marginally significant
way. 9 1
Justice White asserted, however, that the lower courts had
looked at the wrong state interest. 92 While the ban does serve the
Congressional purpose of giving substantial incremental
protection against lottery information to North Carolina, the
more important federal interest is in balancing the concerns of
lottery versus non-lottery states nationwide.93 And that interest is
served by the state-based variations in the broadcasting ban. 94
Applying the Central Hudson four-part balancing formula, the
Court noted that since lottery ads were promoting the "vice" of
gambling, and since government could ban the vice itself, then it
could take the "lesser" step of banning the advertising. 95 This
89. See United States v. King, 834 F.2d 109, 111 (6th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 1022 (1988). In 1890, Congress legislated against the use of
the postal service for delivery of lottery paraphernalia. In 1895, Congress
extended this ban to all interstate commerce. Id.
90. See Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2704 (stating that those states
which permit lotteries may advertise lotteries but states that do not permit
lotteries may not advertise).
91. Id. at 2702. The district court held that as, applied to Edge
Broadcasting,the statutes did not directly advance the asserted governmental
interest and therefore failed the Central Hudson Test. A divided court of
appeals affirmed in all respects. Id.
92. Id. at 2704. The Supreme Court found that the lower courts had
applied the wrong inquiry. The majority held the proper inquiry would have
been whether the "regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted." Id. (quoting Central Hudson, 474 U.S. at 566). Therefore, the
lower courts should not have limited the governmental interest to a single
person or entity, instead it needs to be applied to all other radio and television
stations country wide. Id. The Court held that the statutes in this case directly
advanced the governmental interest at stake. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2707. The Court determined that the broadcast of promotional
advertising of lotteries undermines a state's policy against gambling, and if
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theory comes from a much-criticized decision which upheld a
on advertising legal casino gambling in Puerto Rico. 96
passing that controversial issue, the Court ruled that the
could be sustained as a "reasonable fit" between means
ends.

97

ban
But
law
and

If Virginia's lottery policy and the advertising thereof could
control broadcasting at the edge of North Carolina, then the latter
State's interests would be improperly subordinated to the former
State's policies. The statute, however, lets North Carolina
prevent the broadcast of lottery information from within North
Carolina and reduce, even though only slightly, the amount of

such information that its citizens receive. 98 Thus, as a general
matter, the ban manifests a reasonable fit between means and
ends, which could not be achieved quite as effectively without the
ban. That being so, and the general approach of the statute being
valid, it can be applied generically, even in specific situations
where its particular application might be very questionable.
The two dissenters, Justices Stevens and Blackmun, were quite

upset by the ruling. First, they thought the decision was flatly
inconsistent with Bigelow v. Virginia,9 9 the 1975 case which
upheld the right to advertise in one state services illegal there,

there is an immediate connection between advertising and demand, "and the
federal regulation decreases advertising, it stands to reason that the policy of
decreasing demand ... is correspondingly advanced." Id.

96. Posados De Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478
U.S. 328 (1986). The operator of a Puerto Rican gambling casino filed suit
claiming that a Puerto Rican statute and regulations restricting advertising of
casino gambling violated its commercial free speech rights under the
Constitution. Id. at 331. The Court held that based on the four prong test of
Central Hudson the restrictions in question directly advance the government's
asserted interest and were no more extensive than was necessary to serve the
government's interest. Id. at 343.
97. See Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2705. The Court held that there
was "no doubt that the fit in this case was a reasonable one." In other words, it
was reasonable to require Edge to comply with the restriction against carrying
lottery advertising. d.
98. Id.
99. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
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but legal in another, to wit, abortion. More broadly, they rejected
the majority's entire approach to control of lawful information:
[]lhe Federal Government has not regulated the content of such
[lottery] advertisements, to ensure that they are not misleading,
nor has it provided for the distribution of more speech, such as
warnings or educational information about gambling. Rather, the
United States has selected the most intrusive, and dangerous,
form of regulation possible-a ban on truthful information
regarding a lawful activity imposed for the purpose of
manipulating, through ignorance, the consumer choices of some
of its citizens. Unless justified by a truly substantial
governmental interest, this extreme, and extremely paternalistic,
measure surely cannot withstand scrutiny under the First
Amendment. 100
That it did withstand scrutiny is a function of deference to
Congressional legislative judgments and watered down black
letter law about the "lesser" protection of commercial speech.
Indeed, there is a noticeable tension between Edge Broadcasting
and the news rack and accounting solicitation cases. 10 1 Lotteries
are clearly here to stay, despite the Court's ruling. But the real
test of what the law is will come when Congress tries to ban Joe
Camel ads.
OBSCENITY SALES CASE
Alexander v. United States102
While we are on the subject of the sin of gambling, let us turn
to the sin of pornography and the government's continuing war
on smut.
We are all familiar with "RICO," the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act, passed two decades ago to deal with
100. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2710 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101. See Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (accounting solicitation); Discovery
Network, 113 S. Ct. 1505 (news racks).
102. 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993).
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organized crime. 10 3 The Act's unprecedented arsenal of criminal
and civil penalties and punishments has been before the courts on

numerous occasions. On the criminal side, once a pattern of
racketeering activity has been found, 10 4 additional penalties can
be imposed on the defendant in the form of forfeiture of the
105
assets, proceeds and tools of the criminal enterprise.
But what if the predicate RICO crimes are not loan sharking or
extortion, but selling obscene magazines and movies? And what
if the assets forfeited and destroyed are non-obscene books and
movies protected by the First Amendment? Does the First

Amendment have anything to say about that? Not much, said a
sharply divided Supreme Court. In an opinion written by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, a narrow five to four majority10 6 held that a
conviction for obscenity is no more a bar on the forfeiture of
103. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
104. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (stating that a "pattern of racketeering
activity" requires at least two acts of racketeering activity within a ten year
period).
105. Section 1963(a) of the RICO statute provides in pertinent part: an
individual convicted of a racketeering offense under § 1962 shall be fined or
imprisoned or both, and shall forfeit to the United States these types of assets:
(1) any interest the person has acquired or maintained in the violation of
section 1962;
(2) any
(A) interest in;
(B) security of;
(C) claim against; or
(D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of
influence over; any enterprise which the person has
established, operated, controlled, conducted, participated in
the conduct of, in violation of section 1962; and
(3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the
person obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity
or unlawful debt collection in violation of Section 1962.
Id.
106. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2769. Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia and
Thomas joined in the judgment. Id. Justice Souter filed an opinion which
concurred in judgment in part and dissented in part. Id. at 2766. Justice
Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Blackmun and Stevens
joined, and in which Justice Souter joined as to part II. Id.
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107
related assets than a conviction for any other criminal charge.
Put another way, (1) you can seize the entire comer newsstand if
the owner takes illegal bets under the counter, and (2) you can
impose heavy punishments if the owner sells obscenity there,
then (3) so, too, can you seize the entire newsstand if the owner
sells obscenity there. The dissenters claimed that this third
wrinkle was a lethal and impermissible combination of the first
two because of the chilling effect that would come from the mere
possibility that all of one's First Amendment assets might be
forfeited upon an obscenity conviction based on one or just a few
publications. 10 8 What was unprecedented, they asserted, was the
seizure of protected First Amendment material as a penalty for a
First Amendment-related expressive crime like obscenity. 109
The context of the case was not as sympathetic as the comer
newsstand. But the First Amendment is for scoundrels also. Here
it was a big-time, long-time por dealer, with several outlets in
the Minneapolis area. Several items sold at the stores were found
legally obscene, turning the string of stores into a RICO
enterprise. 110 As a result, the RICO sentence included forfeiture
of millions of dollars of books and films as materials related to
that RICO enterprise, either as an interest in, assets and proceeds
of, or property that gave the defendant control over the
enterprise. 111
The defendant, Ferris Alexander, mounted two First
Amendment challenges to the unprecedented massive forfeiture of
presumptively protected material: first, that it effectively

107. Id. at 2773. The "First Amendment does not prohibit either stringent
criminal sanctions for obscenity offenses or forfeiture of expressive materials
as punishment for criminal conduct." Id.
108. Id. at 2783 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 2783-84 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissenters expressed
concern as follows: "What is happening here is simple: Books and films are
condemned and destroyed not for their own content but for the content of their
owner's prior speech. Our law does not permit the government to burden
future speech for this sort of taint." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 2769-70.
111. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2769-70; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2)
(the RICO forfeiture provision).
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constituted a prior restraint, 112 and second, that the penalties
were overbroad and chilling because the punishment far exceeded

the First Amendment-related crime. 113
The prior restraint defense was turned aside on the ground that
the forfeiture did not constitute a traditional prior restraint, i.e.,
an administrative or judicial order that prohibits speech from
going forward without official approval, the classic essence of
censorship. 114 Here, there were no legal restraints on further
115
speech by Alexander, assuming he amassed new assets.
Finally, the Court conceded that wholesale seizures of books and
116 but
films without a hearing can constitute a prior restraint,
ruled that here there was a trial which found obscenity in some
materials. To be sure, the bulk of the materials seized were not
found illegal, but they were being seized not because they were
11 7
obscene, but because they were related to RICO violations.
You will forgive the suggestion that this is a rather obtuse
distinction.
The overbreadth and chilling effect assertions were rejected on
the basis of the corner newsstand reasoning I suggested earlier:
112. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2771. The Court stated that the term "prior
restraint is used to describe administrative and judicial orders forbidding
certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such
communications are to occur." Id. (quoting M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.03, at 4-14 (1984)) (emphasis in original).
113. Id. at 2774. The Court explained that the "overbreadth" doctrine
allowed defendant to challenge, on its face, an overly broad statute that
restricted speech, even if defendant had engaged in speech which could have
been effectively regulated by a more narrowly tailored statute. Id.
114. Id. at 2770-71.
115. Id. at 2771.
116. See, e.g., Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973); A Quantity of
Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); Bantum Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717
(1961). The Court in Alexander, stated that the "constitutional infirmity" in
almost all of its prior restraint cases dealing with obscene material, was that
the government had seized materials that were suspected of being obscene,
without prior determination that the seized items were in fact obscene.
Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2771-72.
117. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2772.
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Punishments and forfeitures of obscene materials are
permissible; 118 forfeitures of non-obscene materials linked to
related criminal conduct like prostitution

are permissible;

therefore, forfeitures of non-obscene materials as punishment for
selling obscene materials are permissible as well. As the Court
put it: the whole is not greater than the sum of the parts. 119

Prostitution convictions and pornography convictions can equally

120
serve as predicates for forfeiture of protected materials.
But the case was remanded for consideration of the Eighth
Amendment issue of whether the wholesale forfeiture was an
12 1
unconstitutionally excessive fine.
The dissenters, led by Justice Kennedy, saw no need to reach
the Eighth Amendment issue since the forfeitures so clearly
violated the First. 122 They declared the majority's holding "a
deplorable abandonment of fundamental First Amendment
principles." 123 While conceding that the wholesale forfeitures

were not technically a prior restraint, they were certainly
effectively one because they put the owner and his entire
bookstore out of business. In both purpose and effect the

118. See Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc. 478 U.S. 697, 707 (1986) (sustaining
a court ordered forfeiture of adult bookstore used as a place for prostitution
and lewdness).
119. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2775. The Court noted that petitioner's
argument expressed the belief that both stiff criminal penalties for obscenity
offenses and forfeiture of expressive materials, as punishment for criminal
conduct were consistent with the First Amendment. However, the Court
rejected petitioner's "counter-intuitive conclusion" that a combination of these
two premises violates the First Amendment. "[I]n effect," the Court stated,
"[petitioner's conclusion] would say that the whole is greater than the sum of
the parts." Id.
120. See supra note 105.
121. Alexander, 113 S. Ct at 2776.
122. Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy stated that the
"Court's failure to reverse this flagrant violation" of the First Amendment
effectively abandons these principles of free speech and expression. Id.
123. Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, Blackmun, Stevens & Souter J.J., dissenting).
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government was allowed to achieve an impermissible prior
restraint through the RICO back door. 124

CHURCH AND STATE CASES
Moving from the profane to the profound--as well as closer to
home-I would like to discuss the Court's three closely-watched
5

church/state cases. 12
The proper relations between church and state have long been a
126 The First
staple of American constitutional law and history.
Amendment strikes that "delicate balance" by barring
government from making laws "respecting an establishment of
religion," but requiring government to respect "the free exercise

thereof. " 127

The debate has long ensued over whether the purpose of these

provisions is to protect religion against government, or protect
124. See National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 805
(1994) (holding in civil suit against anti-abortion group that application of the
RICO statute contains no requirement of an economic motive).
125. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993);
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993);
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
126. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 2655 (1992) ("It is beyond
dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may
not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or
otherwise act in a way which 'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or
tends to do so.'" (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984))).;
School Dist. of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985). The
Court stated that the First Amendment is "more than a pledge that no single
religion will be designated as a state religion" and "more than a mere
injunction that governmental programs discriminating among religions are
unconstitutional." Id. at 381. "The Establishment Clause instead primarily
proscribes 'sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the
sovereign in religious activity.'" Id. (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religions Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772 (1973)); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) ("In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between
church and State."' (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164
(1878))).
127. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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government against religion, or both? Recently, for example,
Professor Steven Carter at Yale has suggested that we have
unfortunately bent over backwards to exclude religious faith from
12 8
public discussion.

Some of these themes and tensions were played out in the three
cases this Term. Though the government lost all three cases, and
though the votes in two of them were nine to zero, 12 9 there was
considerable disagreement about how to strike that "delicate
balance."
Lamb's Chapel v. CenterMoriches School District130
The easiest of the three cases was the one closest to home. This
case involved both a Free Speech and a Free Exercise claim. 13 1
Lamb's Chapel, an evangelical church group, wanted to use
public school property, after school hours, for a series of films
and discussions, as dozens of civic, political and social groups
had done in that school district in the past. The film series would
show "family-oriented movies from a Christian perspective." 132
School officials refused permission on the ground that the
sponsoring group was "church related." They justified their
action by pointing to a provision of the New York Education
Law that limited the outside use of school property to "social,
civic or recreational purposes" 133 and to administrative and
128. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AmEuuCAN
LAW & PoLrIcs TRvIALizE RELIGIOus DEVOTION (1993).

129. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993); Church of Lukumi Babalu
Aye, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
130. 113 S. Ct. 2141.
131. Id. at 2145.
132. Id. at 2144.

133. See N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 414 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1993). The
statute states in relevant part:
The trustees or board of education of each district may, subject to
regulations adopted as above provided, permit the use of the
schoolhouse and rooms therein, and the grounds and other property of
the district, when not in use for school purposes or when the school is in
use for school purposes if in the opinion of the trustees or board of
education use will not be disruptive of normal school operations, for any
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judicial interpretations that religious purposes were to be
excluded.

134

As the litigation developed, school officials additionally
claimed that permitting the group's proposed use of school
property would violate the Establishment Clause as well. 135
The church group said, of course, "Why us?" The Second
Circuit--without Judge Pratt on the panel 13 6--gave these reasons:
1) The school is not a public forum or a designated public forum,
but is only a limited public forum, i.e., limited to certain
purposes and religious uses are not among them; 137 and 2) Since
the school board had not allowed other religious groups to gain
access, the refusal was viewpoint-neutral and reasonable. 138

The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that it
violated the Free Speech Clause to exclude the group and would

not violate the Establishment Clause to include them. 139
First, the Court referred to its complex public forum
taxonomy--public forum/ designated public forum/ limited public
forum/ non-public forum. 140 Justice White made no effort to
clarify the boundary lines between the categories and instead, the
Court assumed that this was a limited public forum. In that
setting, government can distinguish on the basis of speaker
of the following purposes: '(c) For holding social, civic and recreational
meetings and entertainments, and other uses pertaining to the welfare of
the community; but such meetings, entertainment and uses shall be nonexclusive and shall be open to the general public.'
Id.
134. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2144. Pursuant to § 414, the Board of
Center Moriches Union Free School District issued its own regulations limiting
the use of school property outside of school purposes. One of those rules, Rule
7, which was consistent with judicial interpretation of state law, prohibited any
group from using school premises for religious purposes. Id.
135. Id. at 2145.
136. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959
F.2d 381, 383 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993). This appeal was
presented before Circuit Judges Cardamone, Pierce and Miner. Id.
137. Id. at 386.
138. Id. at 387-88.
139. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2141.
140. See id. at 2146-47.
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identity and topic subject matter, so long as the distinctions are
viewpoint neutral and reasonable. 14 1 But the ban on religious use

is not viewpoint neutral since it permits all other viewpoints on a
topic, while excluding only the religious point of view. If other
perspectives on family values can use the forum, government

cannot exclude speakers with the religious perspective. 142 In
other words, if a Marxist study group can hire the hall to say that

religion is the opiate of the people, a religious group can hold a
meeting to say no we are not. Likewise, if a group can meet to
discuss family values from the sexual diversity perspective, a

group that wants to discuss family values from the religious
perspective cannot be excluded.
To sum up: the First Amendment forbids the government to

regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at
the expense of others. 14 3 The only thing that could possibly
justify such an exclusion of some points of view is if the
exclusion were requiredby the Establishment Clause. 144 Relying

on a 1981 ruling that allowed a religious student group to use a

141. See id. at 2145-47. The Supreme Court accepted the lower court's
limited public forum classification of the school district's property and adopted
the "reasonable" and "viewpoint neutral" standard as well. Id. at 2142-43. The
Court disagreed, however, with the conclusion that Rule 7 had satisfied this
test and reversed the Second Circuit judgment. Id.
142. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc.,
473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985):
Although a speaker may be excluded from a nonpublic forum if he
wishes to address a topic not encompassed within the purpose of the
forum... or if he is not a member of the class of speakers for whose
especial benefit the forum was created... the government violates the
First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to suppress
the point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject.
Id. (citations omitted).
143. See Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers For
Vincent, 446 U.S. 789, 804 (1984).
144. See, e.g., May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 787 F.2d 1105,
1114 (7th Cir. 1986). The court stated that discriminating against a particular
point of view would "flunk the test" set forth in Cornelius provided that
defendants lack a defense based upon the Establishment Clause. Id.
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college meeting room without offending the Clause, 14 5 the Court
extended that principle to allow a religious community group to
use a high school meeting room after school hours. 146 Applying
147
the much-criticized three-part formula of Lemon v. Kurtzman,
the Court decided that since there was no school sponsorship of
the event and it was not on school time, there could be no
perception that the school board was "endorsing" the group's
religion or meeting: 148 "The challenged governmental action has
a secular purpose, does not have the principal or primary effect
of advancing or inhibiting religion, and does not foster an
"
excessive entanglement with religion. 149
Concurring, Justice Kennedy took issue with the need to rely
on Lemon or employ the "endorsing religion" concept, which he
views as too stringent a test of proper accommodation of church
by state. 150 Likewise, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas,
took the occasion to have some fun at the expense of the
malleable Lemon test, comparing it to a ghoul in a late-night
movie "that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad,
after repeatedly being killed and buried." 15 1 They too
complained that the majority's "endorsing religion" concept was
too restrictive an approach to the permissible government
acknowledgment and accommodation of religion. 152
I would note one significant Free Speech Clause by-product of
the Lamb's Chapel case. The Court was clear that government's
allowing a group to use its facilities to meet or speak does not
constitute government endorsement or sponsorship of that

145. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 278 (1981). The Court held
that the State's interest in maintaining strict separation of church and State was
not "sufficiently 'compelling' to justify content-based discrimination
against... religious speech." Id.

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Lamb's Chapel, 113 S.Ct. at 2143.
Widmar, 454 U.S. at 275-78.
Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148.
Id. (applying the Lemon v. Kurtzman three-part test).
Id. at 2149 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 2150-51 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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speech. 153 Thus, when New York City lets the Hibernians have a
St. Patrick's day parade and exclude a gay contingent, that is not
the City acting, it is the Hibernians. 15 4 Likewise, when a public

university permits bigoted speech by students, the university is
not endorsing or sponsoring the speech, merely allowing it.155

But, finally, as schools increasingly become used as general
community centers after school, there may be lots of frictions and
tensions as extremist or very controversial groups seek equal
access to those premises and facilities.
56
Zobrest v. CatalinaFoothillsSchool District

Although the Lemon test 157 received a bit of workout in
Lamb's Chapel, surprisingly, it was barely mentioned in the
Term's other Establishment Clause case, which was the flipside

of the Lamb's Chapel case. Rather than the right of a religious
group to access to public facilities, the next case involved
whether a disabled student at a religious school was entitled to

require that public benefits be provided to him on religious
school premises.
James Zobrest, who has been deaf since birth, asked his local

Tucson, Arizona school district to supply him with a sign
language interpreter to go with him to classes at a Roman
153. Id.
154. See Otway v. City of New York, 818 F. Supp. 659, 664 (S.D.N.Y.
1993). In Otway, the court held that allowing the Ancient Order of Hibernians
to hold a St. Patrick's Day parade on Fifth Avenue, did not equal a
governmental attempt at establishment of religion. Judge Duffy remarked that
"religious speakers have the same right of access to public forums as others."
Id. at 663.
155. See Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 868 (E.D.
Mich. 1989) The court held that speech codes violated the First Amendment,
but rejected the argument that by permitting racist speech on campus, the
public university ratified that speech.
156. 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
157. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. In utilizing the Lemon test, government
action is not violative of the Establishment Clause only if its purpose is
secular, its primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion, and it does
not foster excessive government entanglement with religion.
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Catholic high school, the same service he had had as a public
school student before he transferred to parochial school. 158 His
request was based on the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act. 159 When the school board refused, he and his parents filed
suit. 160 The lower courts rejected his claim on the ground that
providing such assistance would violate the Establishment
Clause. 16 1 The courts felt it would be a sponsorship of religion
by having a public employee, the interpreter, in parochial school,
and it would manifest an impermissible "symbolic union"
between government and religion. 162 One dissenting opinion held
that since the interpreter would be provided through a general
welfare program neutrally available to all children, and the
benefits would be diffused across the country, the request should
163
have been granted.
A sharply divided Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit
dissent. 164 First, the Court, per Chief Justice Rehnquist, rejected
the attempt to dispose of the case on the non-constitutional
ground that the Act itself and the implementing regulations did
not require or authorize the provision of an interpreter in private
schools.

165

Turning to the merits, the Court observed that the
Establishment Clause does not prevent religious organizations
158. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464.
159. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1994). The action was also based upon Arizona
State law. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-761 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
160. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464. The petitioners instituted this action under
20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(A), which gives the district court jurisdiction over
disputes regarding services for disabled children under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act. Id.
161. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir.
1992), af4'd, 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
162. Id. at 1194.
163. Id. at 1199 (Tang, J., dissenting).
164. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2463-64. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the
opinion of the Court in which Justices White, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas
joined. Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Souter
joined and Justices Stevens and O'Connor joined in part. Justice O'Connor also
filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Stevens joined.
165. Id. at 2466.
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from receiving social welfare benefits as part of a general
governmental program neutrally available to all eligible
recipients. 166 In that regard, two cases were particularly apt. In
one, Meuller v. Allen, 167 the Court had upheld a state tax
deduction for educational expenses, even though ninety percent
of those who took the deduction sent their children to religious
schools. 16 8 Even more relevant was Witters v. Washington
Department of Services for the Blind,169 which had sustained
state vocational financial aid to a blind student attending divinity
school. The theme in both cases was that any financial assistance
benefiting religious schools was the result of private decisions of
the recipients of the aid, 170 there were no monetary incentives to
go to religious schools, and the program helped all students,
public and private, religious and secular. 171 The final objectionthat the program would require a public employee to be on
sectarian premises-was turned aside with the observation that the
mere physical presence of such an employee on religious
premises was not enough to constitute an Establishment Clause
violation. 172 The presence of a teacher or a guidance counselor
would be impermissible, but the public employee here would
only interpret, not indoctrinate.
The dissenters insisted that a doctrinal Rubicon had been
crossed with the allowance of a public employee on religious
school premises to relay religious messages, even as an
interpreter. "Until now, the Court never has authorized a public
173
employee to participate directly in religious indoctrination."
Since religious messages infuse the education, both explicitly and
implicitly, the interpreter would be participating in such sectarian
166. Id. at 2463.
167. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
168. Id. at 397.
169. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
170. Id. at 488; Meuller, 463 U.S. at 397.
171. Witters, 474 U.S. at 488 (discussing monetary incentives); Meuller,
463 U.S. at 397 (discussing the benefit to the general population).
172. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2469.
173. Id. at 2471 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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communications. Nor is the defect cured because the program is
a general one, the dissenters insisted. 174 Lots of general

educational assistance has been disallowed to parochial schools.
While the cases draw some fine distinctions between allowable
and disallowable services-busses are good, field trips are bad;
textbooks are good, slide projectors are bad--there is, or was, a
bright line rule: Government crosses the line of separation when
it furnishes the medium for the communication of the religious
message as it would be doing here. 175 The distinction between
the provision of funds and the provision of a person is at the
heart of the Establishment Clauses's concerns. Finally, what of
the religious freedom rights of the interpreter? The dissent
concluded that intermingling of government and religion tends to
destroy government and degrade religion. 176
The final two cases that I will discuss were the two most
closely-watched of the Term; they both dealt with bias and
persecution. 177
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah178
The final church/state case was the only Free Exercise case of
the Term and the first in three years. Although the vote was nine
to zero, the disarray of approaches was dramatic, producing four
separate opinions. The case involved ritual animal sacrifice by
adherents of the Santeria religion, which has its roots in Africa
and Cuba, blending traditional African religion with Roman
Catholicism.
The doctrinal roots of the case go back to 1963 and a case
called Sherbert v. Verner,179 where the Court held that a law
which, in its effects, burdens the free exercise of religion--even
174. Id. at 2473 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 2474 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
176. Id. (Blackman, J., dissenting) (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,
431 (1962)).
177.
(1993);
178.
179.

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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though not so intended-requires a compelling governmental
interest to justify such application. 180 In that case, the result was
that government could not deny unemployment benefits to a
worker whose religion prevented her from working on
Saturday. 18 1 Justice Brennan authored the decision, a classic
example of the liberal Warren Court. A generation later, a new
Court decided Employment Division v. Smith, 182 holding that a
law which unintendedly burdens religious practice is not subject
to strict scrutiny if it is a neutral law of general applicability.1 83
Therefore, drug counselors can be fired for drug use even though
allegedly required by their religious beliefs. 184 Justice Scalia
wrote that opinion, 185 over powerful dissents written by Justice
Blackmun and joined by Justice Brennan. 186 The ritual sacrifice
case was as much about those constitutional doctrines as about
religious doctrines.
The case itself was pretty easy to decide because it was so
atypical. When the Santeria group made known their plans to set
up a church in Hialeah Florida, the City Council almost
immediately passed various resolutions outlawing the "sacrifice"
or "ritual" killing of animals. 187 But effectively exempt from the
laws were hunting and fishing, Kosher practices and almost all
other killings. 188 Calling this a "religious gerrymander," 189 the
Court found the City's very purpose was religious persecutionbanning a religious practice-and not protecting animals from
abuse. 190 Accordingly, the law was not a neutral law of general
180. Id. at 406.
181. Id. at 410.

182. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
183. Id. at 885.

184. Id. at 890.
185. Id. at 874.
186. Id. at 907. Justice Blackmun wrote the dissent in which Justices
Brennan and Marshall joined.

187. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2223-24.
188. Id. at 2228.

189. Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan,
J., concurring)).
190. Id.
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applicability, but was targeted on one religious practice. The
strictest scrutiny would be applied and the ordinance voided. 191
To the question "Why us?," the city had no meaningful answer.
The significant part of the case was the analysis of how to
define neutrality and general applicability. Neutral laws are those
which on their face and/or in their obvious operation are not
targeted against religion. Similarly, general applicability means
that government, in pursuit of legitimate interests, cannot in a
selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by
religious belief. Conversely, "a law that targets religious conduct
for distinctive treatment or advances legitimate governmental
interests only against conduct with a religious motivation will
survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases." 192 But, under Smith, if
a law is found neutral and generally applicable, then the Free
Exercise claim loses. That is the rub.
That is what Justice Souter, donning the mantle of his
predecessor Justice Brennan, concurred, in order to condemn.
His target was the rule that a neutral, generally applicable law is
valid even though it burdens a religious practice. In his mind,
neutrality must be substantive, as well as formal. 193 For
example, a ban on the use of alcohol is formally, but not
substantively, neutral since it burdens religious practices. 194 The
distinction is much like the difference between de jure and de
facto illegality. If a law is not substantively neutral, then
religious practices must be accommodated through exemption
unless the law serves a compelling interest. In his view, the
Hialeah case was the sport, the case of real persecution. But the
questionable Smith rule applies in most typical cases. Yet it is in
tension with earlier cases like Sherbert, which are still on the
books. The solution: reconsider (and presumably overrule) the
Smith case. 195

191. Id. at 2234.
192. Id. at 2233.
193. Id. at 2241.

194. Id.
195. Id. at 2240.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss2/7

34

1994]

Gora: First Amendment

FIRST AMENDMENT

493

There were only three votes for this position, 19 6 but with
Justice Ginsburg there may now be a fourth. While on the Circuit
Court she sided with an Orthodox Jewish Air Force captain who
claimed a Free Exercise right to wear a yarmulke on duty. 197
Though the ban on unauthorized headgear was religiously neutral
and of general applicability, its impact rendered it defective. That
19 8
approach is in flat contradiction to Smith.
BIAS CRIMES
Wisconsin v. Mitchell 199

From the religiously-biased city legislature we turn to a
racially-biased criminal defendant. Can the sentence of such a
defendant for a crime like assault be doubled or tripled because
bigotry motivated his choice of victim. "Why me?" says the
defendant. "Why me?" says the victim. The answer came in the
196. The votes were cast by Justice Souter, concurring and Justices
Blackmun and O'Connor, dissenting.
197. Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 739 F.2d 657, 658 (1984) (en
bane), aft'd, 475 U.S. 501 (1986).
198. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4 (1993). The actual outcome and reasoning
in Smith have been rendered largely moot by the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, signed into law by President Clinton last year. The
statute legislatively codifies and applies the Sherbert compelling interest
approach to all laws that burden religious practices, effectively overruling the
Smith case. Interesting questions about the power of Congress to manage the
content of the First Amendment in that fashion will surely be raised. Of
comparable significance may be the Court's decision to hear an unusual New
York case where the New York Court of Appeals found a violation of the
Establishment Clause in legislation reconfiguring a rural school district so that
its boundaries coincided almost exactly with an Orthodox Jewish community.
See Grumet v. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 81
N.Y.2d 518, 618 N.E.2d 94, 601 N.Y.S.2d 61, cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 544
(1993). Although the school district did not engage in sectarian activities, the
Court of Appeals found a prohibited legislative purpose to help the Jewish
group. The case, which may well reconsider the approach of Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), will be decided later this year.
199. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
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shortest and most perfunctory First Amendment opinion of the

Term.
The constitutional story starts a year earlier in R.A. V.v. St.
Paul, Minnesota.200 There, the Court invalidated a hate speech
ordinance which selected certain forms of bigoted, hateful

fighting words for punishment, while exempting other
comparable insults. 20 1 The Court found that such content-based
targeting of disfavored speech was tantamount to censorship of
one point of view. 202 Though the result in R.A.V. was
unanimous, only a bare majority subscribed to this reasoning. 203
Four Justices thought the State could punish only certain bigoted
fighting words, as long as the definition of fighting words was

precise and not overbroad. 204

R.A. V. dealt with bigoted speech and found it protected by the
First Amendment. 2 0 5 Wisconsin v. Mitchell2 0 6 involved bigoted

conduct, and the outcome was the opposite. Like almost all
states, Wisconsin law allows the sentence for many kinds of

crimes to be dramatically increased or "enhanced" where the
defendant intentionally selects the target of his crime "because of
the race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national
origin or ancestry of that person. '" 207 The facts of the case

200. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).

201. Id. at 2547.
202. Id. at 2548.
203. Id. at 2541. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, and was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Souter and Thomas.
Justice White filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Blackmun and
O'Connor joined, and in which Justice Stevens joined, except as to Part I-A.
Justice Blackmun filed an opinion which concurred in the judgment. Justice
Stevens also filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, and in which Justices
White and Blackmun joined as to Part I. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 2550.
206. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
207. See WIs. STAT. § 939.645 (1989). Section 939.645(l)(b)(a) provides:
[I]f a person does all of the following, the penalties for the underlying
crime are increased [if one] intentionally selects the person against
whom the crime is committed ...

under par. (a) ...
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seemed ideal to mount a serious challenge to such enhancement
statutes. Most of these bias-crime laws have been passed
primarily to protect racial, religious and sexual minorities and
women against hate-filled violence. 20 8 Yet, the facts in this case
involved a victim who was white and a defendant who was
black.209
A group of young black men had been standing and discussing
a movie about racial strife. 2 10 Mitchell, the defendant, said to the
group: "Do you feel all hyped up to move on some white
people?" 2 11 A white teenager happened by and Mitchell said:
"There goes a white boy. Go get him." 2 12 The group did and
beat the victim unconscious. 2 13 Though he did not actually join
in inflicting the beating, Mitchell was convicted of aggravated
battery, 214 which carries a two-year sentence. 2 15 However, once
the crime was found to have been bias-motivated, the sentence
could have more than tripled to seven years2 16 (four years was
the actual sentence).217
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, though deploring the crime,
held that the sentence enhancement was a violation of the First
2 18 The
Amendment under the reasoning in the R.A.V. case.
Court reasoned that the statute impermissibly criminalizes
the race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or
ancestry of that person or the owner or occupant of that property ....
Id.
208. 113 S. Ct. at 2197.

209. Id. at 2196-97.
210. Id. at 2196. The Court explained that a group of young black men and
boys discussed a scene from "Mississippi Burning" in which a white man beat
a young black boy who was praying.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id.
Id. at 2197.
Id.
Id.

215. See Wis. STAT. §§ 940.19(lm), 939.50(3)(e) (1989-90).
216. See Wis. STAT. § 939.645 (1989-90).
217. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2197.

218. Id. at 2197-98 The Mitchell Court held that under R.A.V., "the
Wisconsin legislature cannot ciminalize bigoted thought with which it
disagrees. ... " Id.
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offensive thought by more harshly penalizing crime flowing from
motives and attitudes of bigotry. 2 19 Moreover, the law was
overbroad and chilling because it would allow evidence of a
defendant's thoughts, speech and association to be the basis of
extra punishment.

2 20

In reversing this ruling, Chief Justice Rehnquist, for a
unanimous Court, gave surprisingly short shrift to these
contentions.
First, although the Court conceded that the same criminal
conduct indeed may be punished more severely because of the

defendant's discriminatory "point of view," this was merely a
sentencing issue. Courts have long been allowed to consider a
defendant's motive as part of punishment. 2 2 1 Second, pointing to
anti-discrimination laws in the area of employment and housing,
the Court ruled that selecting a victim for harmful treatment
because of race or similar characteristics could be specially

punishable. 222 The R.A. V. case was distinguished as a hate
speech case, not a hate conduct case. 2 2 3 The government could

conclude that bigoted conduct was so harmful to society as to
merit increased punishment. 224 Finally, the chance that people
would stifle their own bigoted thought or speech for fear that
219. Id. at 2197. The Court held that "[t]he statute punishes the 'because
of aspect of the defendant's selection, the reason the defendant selected the
victim, the motive behind the selection" Id. (emphasis in original).
220. Id. at 2198. The Court found that the penalty-enhancement was
unconstitutionally overbroad and expressed concern that "this evidentiary use
of protected speech" would have a "chilling effect. .

. ."

Id.

221. Id. at 2199 ("[M]otives are most relevant when the trial judge sets the
defendant's sentence .... " (quoting 1 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr,
SUBSTANTrvE CRIMNAL LAW § 3.6(b), at 324 (1986))).
222. Id. at 2200. The opinion explained that Title VII "makes it unlawful
for an employer to discriminate against an employee 'because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.'" Id. (citation
omitted).
223. Id. at 2199.
224. Id. ("[D]eeply ingrained in our legal tradition is the idea that the more
purposeful is the criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense, and,
therefore, the more severely it ought to be punished" (quoting Tison v.
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987))).
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such expression might some day be used against them to enhance
criminal punishment was viewed as too remote and speculative to
constitute an impermissible chilling of protected bigoted
expression. 225
Somewhat surprisingly, there was not even a concurrence, let
alone a dissent. 226 One might have expected one at least from
Justice Scalia, the author of the R.A. V. opinion. 227 Such a
separate opinion might have pointed out that, as in Mitchell, bias
penalties can be a double-edged sword, as readily available
against minority defendants as to protect minority victims. 228
Moreover, despite the Court's dismissing the concern, there is no
clear reason why a defendant's past speech or association could
not routinely be used to enhance punishment in any case where
the defendant and the victim were of different backgrounds.
Finally, the fact remains that a defendant who has expressed
biased opinions or views, either contemporaneously with the
crime or otherwise, suffers more than one who keeps silent. That
reward for silencing of thoughts, however hateful those views
and opinions, should make us at least somewhat uncomfortable
under the First Amendment.
The brief experience with prosecutions under bias crime laws
does not give one a sense of confidence. In several cases there is
the distinct impression that a defendant was given an enhanced
penalty, not for committing a bias crime, but for being a bigoted
person. As one scholar has observed:
Except for its result which correctly affirmed the facial validity
of the Wisconsin penalty enhancer, the Mitchell decision is

unsatisfactory. In blithely affirming the validity of penalty
enhancement for bias crimes, the Court seems to have given the
225. Id. at 2201. The Court found no merit in the contention that the statute

"impermissibly chills free expression with respect to such matters by those
concerned about the possibility of enhanced sentences if they should in the
future commit a criminal offense covered by the statute." Id.
226. Id. at 2196.
227. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541.

228. 113 S. Ct. at 2196-97 (noting a black group attacked a white boy who
then remained in a coma for four days).
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green light to legislatures to enact hate crime laws without
seriously assessing the need for them; to prosecutors to apply
these laws to 'speech crimes' as well as to cases in which the
only evidence of bias is the use of the offensive language; and to
state courts to uphold evidentiary use of protected speech if the
usual evidentiary standards are met, regardless of the impact that
229
such use of speech may have on free expression.
Looking back on this year's First Amendment Term, I think I
felt more secure this time last year. This Term, there were few
decisions that clearly and uncompromisingly stood for First
Amendment freedoms. That may be a vulnerable position from
which to confront the difficult issues on the Court's agenda this
coming season. Rap music's lewd patter, 230 sexually obnoxious
232
workplace comments, 23 1 abortion protester's ugly tactics -these are hardly inspiring champions of First Amendment values.
I hope when the dust settles on the coming Term, the title for
next year's talk will not be Back to the Brink, PartIII.
Judge Leon D. Lazer:
I do not know how I feel about that. In the meantime, we have
our selective questions.
Professor Gary M. Shaw:
One comment, one question. Looking at Alexander, it seems to
me the problem that you talked about, is that the Center is
concerned about a chilling effect. The problem does not really
arise from RICO, the problem arises from the difficulties in
229. James Weinstein, Hate Crime and Punishment: A Comment on
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 73 OR. L. REV. (forthcoming 1994). Not all post-

Mitchell courts have been indifferent to free speech concerns in this context.
See United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (remanding
for new trial in cross-burning case prosecuted as civil rights violation).
230. Acuff-Rose Music v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.

granted, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993).
231. Harris v. Forklift Sys., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
232. National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
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determining what is obscene. It really would not matter whether
we are dealing with something as chilling and as harsh as RICO,
because the problem is that the real chilling effect lies not within
RICO itself, but rather in the difficulties in determining what is
obscenity and what is not.
ProfessorJoel M. Gora:
Well, it may be the combination of the two. The RICO
punishments combined with the obscenity uncertainties create the
chilling effect.
Professor Gary M. Shaw:
The question would be, do you think that Zobrest233 is an order
for overruling Meek v. Pittinger.234 In terms of the material aids,
the educational materials that the court was concerned with could
be subverted in quotes to sectarian use, do you think Zobrest may
serve as a precedent for overruling that aspect of Meek v.
Pittinger?235
ProfessorJoel M. Gora:
I think the court is going to be relaxing some of the restrictions
on the provision of neutral services to all schools including
sectarian schools. Frankly, it seems to me - I cannot understand
why letting all schools, private and public, religious or secular,
have State supplied movie projectors or video cameras is an
establishment of religion in a church-oriented school but not a
problem in a private school or public school. I think some of
those distinctions - it is one thing to provide doctrinal
instruction; it is another thing to provide these mechanics that all
kids need and all kids ought to get, whichever school they attend.

233. 113 S. Ct. (1993).
234. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
235. Id.
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Judge Leon D. Lazer:
Are there any other questions?
Audience Member:
I have one brief comment and a question pertaining to the
Witters case. 2 3 6 You might not know that on remand, the
Washington State Supreme Court upheld the Washington
constitutional provision and refused to award a scholarship to the
blind student who wanted to study in the seminary. 237 All the
United States Supreme Court held was that the scholarship was
not precluded by the Establishment Clause, not that it had to be
provided as a ground of free exercise, but otherwise. My
question is about commercial speech and, in particular, lawyer's
solicitation. You know about the Ohralik case where a lawyer
went to a hospital where two patients lay prostrate?
ProfessorJoel M. Gora:
That is the Ohralik case. 238
Audience Member:
Were you suggesting that Ohralik might be endangered?
ProfessorJoel M. Gora:
No. I think what will happen is this: What is now the basic rule
is that there cannot be in-person solicitation unless it is for a
public interest organization where there is no pecuniary gain in
the lawyer's mind. That is how you deal with those two cases. I
think it will ultimately reach the point where you can engage in
in-person solicitation unless you are an "Ohralik" visiting an
236. Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481
(1986).

237. Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119 (Wash. 1989).
238. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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accident victim in the hospital room. So it will be a general
permission but an exclusion for those highly charged or
vulnerable situations.
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